Coping with the Chernobyl disaster: a comparision of social effects in two reindeer-herding areas by Beach, Hugh
Coping with the Chernobyl disaster: a comparision of social effects in two 
reindeer-herding areas 
Hugh Beach 
Center for Arctic Cultural Research, Umeå University, 901 87 Umeå, Sweden 
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This paper concerns socio-cultural issues foll-
owing upon the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
with regard to the Swedish Saami. Studies 
treating the social aspects o f the Chernobyl dis-
aster have been few, and yet they are essential 
i f reasonable policies are to evolve for coping 
with nuclear contamination of our food chain. 
Such a focus reveals diverse unforeseen con-
sequences deriving not only from the contami-
nation itself, but also from the compensatory 
policies which it has occasioned. I have recently 
raised a number o f these points with regard to 
assessment o f low-dose radiation risk at the 
twelfth International Congress o f Anthropo-
logical and Ethnological Sciences in Zagreb 
(Beach, forthcoming) and will have cause to re-
capitulate some of them here. In this paper I 
shall demonstrate the broad scale o f Cher-
nobyl-related social issues. Whi l e it will not be 
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possible to examine all o f the problems, I shall 
draw attention to some o f the anomalies that 
can occur with the superimposition o f ad hoc 
measures onto old regulations. 
It should be noted at the outset that many o f 
the topics raised here lend themselves easily to 
larger political debates and are controversial in 
a number o f different contexts. M y purpose, 
however, is to give the the views and experi-
ences o f my herding informants. Whi l e these 
views might not always be based on a fully corr-
ect knowledge or interpretation of the facts, the 
are nonetheless real and o f social significance. 
The data sampled here originate from inter-
views made in the field with herding families as 
part of a long-term study financed by the Bank 
of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and admi-
nistered under the Center for Arc t i c Cultural 
Research at U m e å University, Sweden. W e 
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have sought to record from the Swedish Saami 
reindeer-herding families themselves their 
fears, the damages they have sustained, and 
their efforts to deal with these problems. Both 
male and female research team members inter-
viewd people in two main regions, one highly 
impacted by nuclear fallout (Vilhelmina), and 
one relatively lightly impacted (Jokkmokk). 
Care was taken to interview herders and family 
members o f different sex and age as well as to 
include families with young children. N o n -
herding Saami, Saami handicraftsmen, and 
even non-Saami were also interviewd in order 
to gain insight into the herders' social context 
and possible cultural constraints. Interviews 
were conducted both in Vihelmina and Jokk-
mokk in summer 1987, autum 1987 and 
winterl987/88. The project will attempt to 
cover a five- year period with repeated follow-
up interviews. 
A s background information a few essential 
facts deserve mention: The reindeer-herding 
area o f Sweden is currently divided into 51 
grazing districts called samebys. Membership in 
these samebys is tightly controlled both by regu-
lations in the Swedish Reindeer Herd ing A c t of 
1971 and by the existing members themselves. 
Membership confers, besides the right to graze 
one's reindeer on sameby territory, also certain 
hunting and fishing rights. T h e right to herd 
reindeer in Sweden is almost exclusively reserv-
ed for those o f Saami heritage. A sameby, there-
fore, defines both a territorial and a social unit. 
Reindeer herding is centrally administrated 
under the National Board o f Agriculture, to 
which is tied an advisory body with Saami re-
presentation. Regionally herding questions are 
handled under three provincial agriculture 
committees. T h e samebys all belong to the Swe-
dish Saami Parliamentary Organization (SSR), 
which is the main political body o f Saami in 
Sweden. In Sweden today, there are only about 
900 active reindeer herders, with family mem-
bers bringing the total of those directly depen-
dent upon herding to approximatley 2,500 
people. The reindeer stock in Sweden today is 
estimated at about 275,000 head. Reindeer 
herding is not, however, o f major economic im-
portance to the Swedish State. It is tolerated 
under normal circumstances and has been 
supported during the Chernobyl crisis largely 
as a concession to the cultural preservation of 
the Saami. T h e reindeer industry is hard press-
ed even in the best o f times to assert itself 
against the heavy industrial exploitation o f the 
grazing land. 
In the early 1980s, the reindeer-slaughter 
company, Sameprodukter, servicing as much as 
75% of the reindeer herding area, was reorgan-
ized and taken over predominately by Saami. 
SSR, the Saami political organization, bought 
controlling interest in the company. Although 
Sameprodukter is one of the largest and most 
modern o f slaughter facilities active in the 
Jokkmokk area, it is not the only one. There 
are a number o f other, smaller slaughter comp-
anies competing for the purchase o f reindeer 
from the herders. The Vilhelmina area is al-
most entirely serviced by the large and fully 
modern slaughter facility o f Lapplandsvilt. T h e 
different slaughter companies are capable o f 
meeting different hygienic standards, and these 
differences in turn determine the extent to 
which the meat can be exported. 
The following is a highly compressed 
account o f the kinds o f issues raised by the 
Chernobyl disaster which affect the livelihoods 
and traditions o f the Saami: 
In the wake o f Chernobyl, contradictory 
statements and confusion were legion. A s a 
result, Saami faith in politicians and admini-
strative authorities seems to have reached a low 
point. N o t only have different experts evalu-
ated health risks differently, but in many 
instances herdes claim that administrative 
blunders have resulted in unnecessary reindeer 
losses. 
Herders resent the "sacrifice" o f their rein-
deer meat to preserve a contamination limit on 
marketability devised on the basis o f risks to 
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newborn infants and their consumption o f milk 
(Labba, 1988). Mos t potential consumers of 
reindeer meat are not infants. Furthermore, 
since pre-Chernobyl reindeer often displayed 
B q values over the post-Chernobyl state mar-
ketability limit (Hagberg, 1976), herders 
understandably ask why no limit was set previ-
ously i f the pre-Chernobyl reindeer contamina-
tion really posed a health risk. I f such pre-
Chernobyl levels constitute no major risk, why 
then have so many reindeer been confiscated 
with such low levels following upon Chernobyl? 
There may be valid answers to some of these 
questions. M y point is to show the confusion 
surrounding these issues. 
In M a y o f 1987, the marketability limit was 
raised by Statens Livsmedelsverk (SLV), the 
National Board of Foodstuffs, from 300 Bq/kg 
to 1500 Bq/kg for reindeer meat, game and in-
land fish, basic foodstuffs o f the Saami, while 
the lower limit for the basic foodstuffs o f the 
average Swede was maintained. According to 
the authorities, this measure was acceptable as 
the average Swede eats only 200 grams o f rein-
deer meat per year (at least he did previous to 
Chernobyl) and, moreover, this would put more 
reindeer meat on the market. It is evident that 
many of the state's reactions to the complicated 
ramifications o f this sudden and unique disaster 
have not been fully considered. Understand-
ably, the Saami feel themselves to be discrimi-
nated against when, for example, their school 
children who normally eat a substantial amount 
o f rendeer meat are now referred to meat with 
levels up to 1500 Bq/kg, while meat below 600 
Bq/kg is selected out for export to Germany. 
Even though low-level meat was accessable to 
Saami children by various means, many resent-
ed the fact that a quality separation was made 
for export to small-quantity consumers but not 
for local, large-quantity consumers. 
S L V sought to meet the obvious criticism for 
having established one health limit for the basic 
foods o f the Swedish majority and another for 
the basic foods o f the Saami minority by issuing 
a pamphlet o f dietary recommendations (Stat-
ens Livsmedelsverk, 1987) to each herding fa-
mily. In it, those with a high consumption o f 
reindeer meat were advised to keep records o f 
the quantity and contamination level o f all the 
reindeer meat they ate, the dosage being a pro-
duct o f the two. A s long as the yearly recom-
mended dosage was not exceeded, the pamph-
let did not discourage the consumption o f meat 
with values up to 10,000 Bq/kg. Yet, at the 
same time, expert statements claimed the risks 
from low-dose radiation to be directly proporti-
onal to exposure, whether it be for an instant or 
over the years. The analogy was made to driv-
ing a car; the more one drives, the greater the 
danger o f accident. (Note that this analogy 
should be broadened to include the risk to fell-
ow "passengers" so as to encompass the poss-
ible risk o f genetic disorder to the offspring 
even i f the "driver" appeard to survive the 
"traffic" unscathed.) Some herders wonder: I f 
it is not the B q value itself but the product o f 
B q value times quantity consumed which is im-
portant, why should the tally for one year be 
significant rather than the compounded tally o f 
Bq /kg times kg over a lifetime? 
Obviously, confusion over the issue o f health 
risk is widespread. Almost none o f the herders 
interviewed bothered to keep records o f the 
contamination values and quantities o f the meat 
they consumed. Although they were well aware 
that it was B q value times quantity which was 
important, many still treated the marketability 
limit as a health risk barrier, even i f they would 
rather take the risks than respect it. The quin-
tupling o f what many tended to regard as the 
health risk limit was met with great cynicism by 
those who had previously had faith in the 
authorties. H a d the initial limit been set at 
1500 Bq/kg, the matter would have deen diffe-
rent. Due to the confusion, herders have 
fashioned their own B q limits for the meat they 
would eat, based largely on general social con-
sensus (neighbours, experts, media, the N o r -
wegian limits etc.) and personal discomfort 
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(economic, dietary and cultural). 
Some o f the problems seem to be inevitable 
consequences o f the state's need to supervise 
inspection and enforce saftey standards. 
Members o f herding families repeatedly com-
plain over the loss not only o f reindeer meat, 
but also o f foods obtained from the blood and 
internal organs o f the reindeer. These are o f 
major importance to Saami identity. Foods pre-
pared from the reindeer are loaded with tradi-
tions. T h e Saami who cannot slaughter and 
prepare food from his own reindeer according 
to his own special customs feels himself cultur-
ally impoverished. Herd ing parents fear that 
their children will miss the opportunity to learn 
these customs. 
Herders in the hardest hit regions are often 
able to purchase frozen, low-level reindeer car-
casses from further north, but although these 
provide meat, they do not provide blood and 
organs. Herders frequently complain that these 
reindeer, purchased from the slaughterhouses, 
are not handled or slaughtered to their liking. 
Many herders would accept the risks o f greater 
contamination within bounds in order to 
slaughter and butcher their own household 
reindeer, rather than obtain cleaner meat from 
the north. 
Slaughterhouses which had access to rein-
deer under the contamination limit would 
sometimes allow herders to make a simple ex-
change o f "bad" meat for an equal amount o f 
"good" meat. A t other times, however, this 
would not be feasible. In either case, the testing 
itself would supposedly leave the herders seve-
ral options o f choice. Herders would be allow-
ed to choose themselves whether or not they 
wanted to keep the meat o f a bad reindeer for 
their own use—as long as it was not sold. But 
events proved that frequently the slaughter-
houses could not guarantee such special treat-
ment, and all reindeer over the limit, whether 
or not one was chosen by a herder for his own 
personal use, would be confiscated. Many herd-
ers complained that when they tried to collect 
the reindeer they had picked for their own 
household use, they found that it had been de-
stroyed already, even i f the test results showed 
it to have had a becquerel level as low as only 
310 Bq/kg. Large-scale testing and compensa-
tion operations were hardly geared for the 
needs o f the herding family to provide its own 
meat supply. 
A leading cause o f all the controversy is the 
fact that while the risks from various amounts 
o f contamination consumed are scaled, they are 
not calibrated. Consumption o f one kilogram 
of 600 B q meat may be twice as dangerous as 
consumption o f an equal amount o f 300 B q 
meat, but no one can yet provide a credible 
account o f the risks to health involved with 
either dosage expressed, for example, in per-
centages o f additional deaths. Expert state-
ments cover the breadth o f the spectrum from 
claiming there is almost nothing to fear and al-
most no precautions necessary, to predicting 
hundreds o f additional cancer deaths. The so-
cial consequences o f the Chernobyl disaster are 
therefore largely the result o f opinions and 
fear—those o f the herders and those o f the 
state—without concrete foundations in biologi-
cal fact. Th is is not to say that all such reactions 
are unreasonable given the situation, only that 
the facts are not available for reason alone to 
dictate a course o f action. 
Families with small children in regions o f 
high contamination took extra care to ensure 
that their children ate meat with the lowest 
contamination they could obtain, usually, at 
levels under the state marketability limit. Even 
though some parents would eat meat they 
would not serve their children, others found it 
too difficult to keep menus divided and there-
fore joined their children in a low-level reindeer 
diet. In the early stages of the disaster, many 
herders took the precaution o f preparing their 
food in such a way as to rid it o f as much cesium 
as possible. To give but one example, the water 
in which reindeer meat was cooked was often 
discarded. This practice declined in many areas 
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once the states's marketability limit was quin-
tupled, freeing most reindeer for sale. 
Other efforts to decontaminate reindeer 
meat attempt to lower cesium levels in the rein-
deer while it is still alive. These efforts involve 
the use o f artificial fodder (even with cesium-
reducing additives) and/or the freighting o f en-
tire herds by truck long distances to cleaner 
pastures. Such measures can involve major 
changes in land use and herding scheduling, be-
sides much extra work and the extended separa-
tion o f family members. 
The effort to decontaminate the reindeer be-
fore slaughter has brought about considerable 
extra costs. A m o n g these are expenses incurred 
through changes in reindeer management 
scheduling. Prior to Chernobyl, slaughter-
houses would not accept rut bulls. Some herd-
ers have claimed that because of initial policy 
delays by the authorities, the September 
slaughter o f bulls near full rut in their samebys 
was also delayed, with the result that hormone 
levels increased enough to render the meat 
unusable. In one o f the particularly hard-hit 
areas, herders, realizing that their bulls would 
all contain a very high level o f contamination at 
the usual autumn slaughter anyway and there-
fore unavailable to them as food even i f bring-
ing income from compensation, chose to post-
pone the regular slaughter o f early rut bulls in 
September in order to hunt moose. Meat from 
the moose is not at all as contaminated as rein-
deer meat and therefore is more attractive to 
the herders as food (Labba, 1988:36). 
Saami who, because o f their need for funds, 
had acquiesced in the slaughter of animals 
doomed for becquerel confiscation, were prone 
to ignore the pre-rut slaughter schedule (no 
longer conceived o f as time critical) when this 
came to interfere with their ability to supply 
themselves with another traditional food. 
Under the existing circumstances, it seemed 
absurd i f meat were to be rejected by the 
slaughterhouses, because o f hormone levels 
when it was already non-consumable from the 
becquerel perspective. In a hasty measure in-
tended to make up for losses form delayed 
autumn slaughters, the Minister o f Energy 
agreed in Sept. 6, 1986 to extend compensation 
to all " ru t" bulls slaughtered, i.e. even to those 
bulls which had progressed too far in the rutt-
ing cycle to be saleable. Th is compensation 
would apply whether or not the meat would 
have passed becquerel safety standards. 
Compensation policies have been disigned 
primarily to keep herders unharmed while pur-
suing their traditional work with the reindeer, 
as i f nothing had happened. But the herders 
preferred to hunt the moose whose meat was 
far less contaminated than that o f their rein-
deer. In the hard-hit areas, especially, moose 
meat has been one o f the main substitutes for 
reindeer meat. Moose meat has always been a 
part of the traditional diet and has the advan-
tage of being a subsistence commodity, frequ-
ently requiring no cash purchase. T h e herders 
knew that whether or not their bulls were 
slaughtered at the normal time or obtained too 
high a hormonal level for sale, they would still 
be barred from the market and confiscated on 
the grounds o f their radiation contamination. 
. A recurring general issue o f major impor-
tance concerning compensation policies is 
whether funds should be distributed simply to 
compensate for so called "becquerel meat" 
obtained through following a normal year's 
routine, or i f it should in some way prioritize the 
production o f good meat. Th is problem is 
complicated by consumer purchasing resist-
ance against reindeer meat and the difficulty in 
selling even low-level meat. A s a result, some 
slaughterhouses have already come to offer the 
herders less for their good meat than the herd-
ers can obtain from the compensation pay-
ments for their becquerel meat. Herders have 
commented that it would be smarter for them 
to feed their reindeer becquerels rather than 
the artificial fodder designed to decontaminate 
them. 
Besides compensating for contaminated rein-
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deer meat itself and the expenses connected 
with producing marketable meat, the gover-
ment has also provided compensation for the 
destroyed fishing and berry picking harvests o f 
the northern inhabitants, Saami as well as Swe-
des. Compensation o f this sort, however, in-
volves quite a different process from that rela-
ted to reindeer meat. Whereas the herders are 
compensated for the unmarketable meat they 
produced, it would be senseless to require 
people to catch the contaminated fish or pick 
the contaminated berries, only to throw them 
away after establishing compensation demands. 
Instead, estimates o f lost income or food value 
have been made on the basis o f a person's pre-
vious harvest record. Those seeking such com-
pensation are supposed to file for it, giving in-
formation about lost harvests. Often a standard 
sum in compensation is given each applicant, 
who, i f he or she thinks it too little, can appeal 
the decision. To substantiate a case o f high 
compensation demand, the authorities usually 
have requested the applicant to demonstrate his 
or her customary harvest size on the basis ofthe 
tax declaration of 1985. Many o f my inform-
ants have accepted what they consider grossly 
inadequate compensation rather than subject 
themselves to what they regard as a rude in-
spection o f their tax records. 
Herders in different provinces, when com-
paring notes, have found that similar applica-
tions could result in vastly dissimilar compen-
sation payments. W i t h i n each province, the 
strictness o f the rules for distributing compen-
sation varies according to the ratio o f the total 
demand for compensation in relation to the 
amount o f funds allocated to the province for 
that purpose by the central government. Whi l e 
a herder in the Norrbotten province might re-
ceive good compensation for the loss o f his tra-
ditional catch o f fish (even i f small), a herder in 
Vasterbotten with similar demands might re-
ceive nothing because the fishing is not con-
sidered his major source of income. Rather 
than administering a single policy for the entire 
country, so that similar demands would lead 
consistently to similar compensation, the cen-
tral government has given the provinces the 
job. The provinces have not at all received the 
same amount o f compensation funds or an equ-
al proportion o f compensation funds in relation 
to demands. 
A s a result o f the Chernobyl disaster, herding 
households suffered not only a blow to their 
herding directly, but also to their herding life-
style in general, a lifestyle to considerable de-
gree dependent upon supplemental incomes 
from non-herding sources and non-herding 
subsistence resources. Besides the loss o f fish-
ing and berry picking, tourism has decreased. 
The earlier slaughter o f reindeer has even 
made it more difficult to obtain reindeer antlers 
o f a quality fit for handicraft work. In short, the 
economic flexibility o f the family has decrea-
sed, and herders must weigh the trouble and 
humiliation o f seeking compensation against 
taking greater B q risks. 
O n the positive side, herders in the hard-hit 
areas have managed to cope with many o f the 
problems o f access to traditional foods of low 
contamination with help o f a wide network o f 
friends and family. Especially herding families 
o f northern Saami origin have relatives spread 
throughout the Swedish herding districts due 
to the enforced relocation o f northern Saami in 
the early part o f this century. Saami in low-
contamination areas have often sent fish, berri-
es and even reindeer meat to their less fortunate 
relatives and friends. Herders in the hard- hit 
areas have not infrequently undertaken trips 
further north where they have been able to pur-
chase a reindeer and slaughter and butcher it 
themselves according to traditional specifica-
tions. Even i f such channels o f food redistri-
bution have not had heavy traffic, their influ-
ence can hardly be overestimated. The ability 
to obtain at least some traditional foods to pre-
pare oneself according to customs means very 
much indeed, not least for the expression and 
practice o f cultural identity. 
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Naturally, the Chernobyl disaster has also 
taken a psychological toll upon many herders 
who had come to feel themselves as wards o f 
the state, subsidized by state compensation pay-
ments, people whose work was meaningless. 
W i t h the change o f marketability limit (which 
alone had freed most reindeer for the market) 
and the decontaminating efforts o f artificial 
fodder and earlier slaughters (which have 
brought many o f the reindeer in high contami-
nation areas under the limit), most herders are 
no longer receiving compensation for their 
reindeer. A s noted earlier, however, there is the 
danger that they will receive a relatively poor 
price for their meat due to purchasing re-
sistance. 
There has been a good deal o f worry if, after 
the Chernobyl disaster, young Saami recruits to 
the herding livelihood will be as numerous as 
would otherwise have been the case. We have 
yet to come across any examples in our re-
search areas of a decrease o f Saami herders or 
Saami herding recruits because o f Chernobyl. 
However, we have found young herders who 
have prudently decided to postpone major new 
investments in livestock or housing until they 
were more sure o f the future. 
Even in the hard-hit regions, herders now feel 
that the problems they face, although very like-
ly long-lasting, can be dealt with. Whi l e many 
of their reindeer are still over the limit, they 
now know that their reindeer can be brought 
below the limit, albeit for short periods and at 
added expense. This expense is borne by the 
state, but herders need not feel that they are 
mere welfare recipents, for they can produce a 
quality product for human consumption. 
Nonetheless, even though government ex-
pense for supporting the herding industry in 
this hour of crisis has decreased greatly, com-
pensation to herders and slaughterhouses is 
still considerable. Herders are worried i f com-
pensation payments will impair the ability o f 
herders to resist threats to the grazing lands by 
extractive industries such as the hydro-electric 
power industry and the timber industry? W i l l 
prolonged compensation place the herders in 
such a position o f dependency that the herding 
livelihood will collapse once this compensation 
is removed? Many herders fear that the con-
siderable support provided them by the state 
will in time cause their Saami rights to be look-
ed upon as Saami privileges which can be re-
moved (like compensation payments) by the 
state at will without due process (Beach, 1987). 
A more permanent extra expense occasioned 
by alteration in the scheduling o f herding 
events has been that brought about by early 
slaughter in southern Lapland. In the Vilhelmi-
na area, the discovery that slaughters in late 
August might result in meat under the limit—in 
contrast to the high values recorded during the 
winter—causes earlier than normal slaughters. 
Currently, the relatively low B q levels in the 
Jokkmokk area and the institutionalization o f 
the raised marketability limit demand no 
changes in slaughter timing for the reindeer to 
clear the limit. Previous to the raising o f the 
limit, however, many samebys, even in the more 
lightly contaminated areas, corralled their rein-
deer for autumn slaughters earlier than 
customary in order that the reindeer would be 
slaughtered before making the transition to the 
heavily contaminated lichen diet. In southern 
Lapland, the early slaughters will probably con-
tinue for many years to come. Such changes in 
scheduling have had unforeseen ramifications. 
In the Swedish mountain sameby herding cycle, 
the earlier it is in autumn, the further removed 
the reindeer are toward the west and the more 
spread out they are. Bringing these reindeer to 
slaughter has necessitated in many instances a 
far greater reliance upon air support, notably 
helicopters, than usual. This has added a siz-
able cost, one that was initially, at least, borne 
by the state. 
A number o f our informants indicated that 
the promise o f compenstaion for the extra fly-
ing time needed has resulted in an overly care-
free use o f helicopters. They worry that, should 
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this compensation continue for many years, the 
herding system would become far too helicopt-
er dependent. Herders and reindeer would no 
longer know any other way. The emergency 
measure would become customary, and before 
long even a necessity, driving up the costs of 
herding. Even before Chernobyl, the over-use 
of technological equipment has been viewed as 
a growing problem by many herders, and some 
regard the compensation measures as aggrava-
ting the problem. Other herders do not see the 
use o f modern equipment as a problem at all, 
but they are concerned that compensation poli-
cies will generate costly habits o f use which will 
prove ruinous once state compensation ceases. 
O f course, the added expense o f rounding 
the herd up for early slaughter stems not only 
from increased use of helicopters, but also from 
reduced sales income. T h e earlier in autumn 
the bulls are slaughtered, the less they weigh. 
The herders and their Saami organizations 
have been negotiating with the government 
over compensation payment to cover the weight 
sacrificed for the sake of producing marketable 
meat. 
The reindeer slaughter industry, too, has 
been affected heavily by Chernobyl. In the 
Jokkmokk area, where slaughterhouses are nu-
merous and habitually in competition for rein-
deer, herders have been constantly discussing 
slaughterhouse policies. Although a herder will 
usually sell to whichever slaughterhouse is on 
the scene and gives the best price, herders have 
often expressed strong preferences and loyal-
ties to particular slaughter companies. A 
number o f herders have voiced the suspicion 
that government compensation to the 
slaughterhouses is being distributed in an un-
fair manner partly in an effort to promote re-
structuring o f the slaughter industry according 
to state plans. 
Due to the quirks o f compensation policy to 
the slaughterhouses, considerable profits could 
be made from the slaughter o f becquerel rein-
deer without much effort. Like the herders, 
slaughterhouses have also been compensated 
for the meat o f the becquerel reindeer they 
have slaughtered, though at a much lower rate. 
A s highly contaminated meat is destroyed, pro-
cessing procedure at the slaughterhouses is un-
necessary. Moreover, slaughterhouses have al-
so received compensation for their reduced 
sales o f processed meat sold as a delicacy pro-
duct. Competition for becquerel reindeer be-
came fierce, and slaughterhouses have been 
accused o f using inequitable methods in the 
struggle. Some slaughterhouses have obtained 
large sums in compensation and support o f 
their businesses, while others have received 
nothing. Those which have received funding 
are accused of using their compensation to gain 
an unjust advantage in the bidding for becque-
rel meat. 
One slaughterhouse which was heavily de-
pendent upon state aid offered a better price for 
becquerel meat than the usual governmeant 
rate o f compenation, i f in return the herders 
would refrain from inviting other slaughter-
houses to attend their slaughter. Naturally this 
has caused a storm o f protest by other 
slaughter companies and the herders support-
ing them. Was compensation payment to be 
utilized as a weapon in market wars between 
slaughterhouses? Moreover, i f one slaughter-
house tried to meet the problems imposed by 
Chernobyl, for example by laying off personnel 
so as to minimize losses, should this company 
receive less compensation than another 
slaughterhouse that refused to cut back and 
therefore could demonstrate a larger loss in-
curred by Chernobyl? I f the rule governing 
compensation payment is that it should simply 
cover loss, then any business which tried to cut 
its losses would be rewarded with less compen-
sation. Incentive to improve the difficult situa-
tion would thereby be destroyed. 
The differential payments to the different 
slaughterhouses have appeared quite arbitrary. 
T h e authorities are accused o f helping a few 
big companies, whether inadvertently or by de-
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sign while ruining the small companies' ability 
to compete. I f this has been by design rather 
than by the blind following o f insensitive regu-
lation (and I have not been able to establish for 
certain which it is), perhaps it is motivated by a 
wish to rationalize the reindeer slaughtering 
business. Even so, while it may well be that the 
authorities deem it unnecessary to have so 
many competing companies given the scale of 
the reindeer slaughters, nonetheless one can as 
a matter o f principle question whether disaster 
compensation payments should be slanted in 
such a way as to promote the rational restructu-
ring o f a business, favoring some against 
others. 
Some herders worry that many of the small 
slaughterhouses will be forced from the field 
and that herders will lose the benefit o f a com-
petitive market for their reindeer. I f competi-
tion in the slaughter industry should fall, the 
risk could grow that slaughterhouses might 
give the herders a lower price even for their 
good meat, under the pretence that purchasing 
resistance demanded it. But while it may well be 
that some resistance to the purchase o f rein-
deer meat forces down the price the slaughter-
houses can in turn pay the herders, it is practi-
cally impossible to know what part of a price 
drop is due to real purchasing resistance and 
what part is due to the slaughterhouses' desire 
for greater profit. 
There is also cause for concern in the fact 
that Sameprodukter, one o f the largest 
slaughter companies to receive massive state 
support in the form o f Chernobyl compensa-
tion payments, is mostly owned by SSR, the 
Saami herders' major political organization. 
Just prior to the Chernobyl disaster, Samepro-
dukter seemed to be on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. Now, some say as a result of large com-
pensation payments, it has made a fast recove-
ry. Owners o f slaughterhouses which have 
received little to no compensation compared to 
Sameprodukter argue that the Swedish state, 
sworn to protect the Saami herders and the 
Saami culture from the ills o f Chernobyl, can 
hardly afford to let Sameprodukter be a victim. 
But while the aid to Sameprodukter is generally 
applauded by the herders, many are worried i f 
this economic link to thier political organiza-
tion might not in some way come to compro-
mise its other, political efforts for the Saami in 
its confrontation with the state. Sameprodukter 
itself claims that is has received no particularly 
favorable treatment, and surely one cannot ex-
pect it to refuse government compensation and 
risk financial ruin because o f its connecton to 
the Saami political organization. 
Whi l e both the state and the Saami can be re-
lieved that the effects o f Chernobyl now appear 
to be o f a scale which can be absorbed by the 
flexibility o f the government's budget, as well 
as by the herders' economy and by the Saami 
culture, I think it sobering to contemplate in 
closing the dilemma of principle in which this 
disaster has placed the Saami culture. It could 
have been worse. After all, the fallout from 
Chernobyl was by no means the first to reach 
Lapland, and the absorption properties o f the 
lichen place the reindeer, and through them the 
Saami, in an extremly vulnerable position. 
A t first appearance one might consider that 
the demonstrated threat o f nuclear fallout to 
the Saami culture through the reindeer would 
cause the Saami to seek a broader cultural base, 
one that would serve to hold them together 
even i f the herding industry should be desperat-
ely crippled sometime in the future. A t the 
same time, however, it is precisely because o f 
this vulnerability o f the Saami through their 
reindeer that they have been granted special 
compensatory policies over and above those be-
stowed upon other citizens. Should another, 
similar disaster occur, the Saami may well be 
best served in the short run by promoting even 
more the linkage between their culture and the 
practice o f reindeer herding. In the long run, 
however, to absolutize this linkage could be fa-
tal. The state can only do so much. I f ever beset 
with long-lasting, wide-spread and high-level 
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contamination at some future date, reindeer 
herding in Sweden will be in the hands o f the 
consumer, regardless o f any compensatory 
policies devised by the state. These can be but 
stop-gap measures. O f course, it is true that the 
importance o f this practice to the Saami as a 
whole can hardly be overemphasized; yet there 
is more to Saami culture than reindeer. 
In this first year of work with investigating 
the long-term social effects o f the Chernobyl 
nuclear disaster for the Swedish Saami, our re-
sults cannot necessarily boast of long-term 
applicability. Many of the issues raised have 
concerned the worries of herders over some fu-
ture possible development. Whi l e such things 
as worries, depressions, and the methods to 
cope with them do consitute social facts in 
themselves, deserving consideration on their 
own account, concrete social changes (some-
times the objects o f worry, but sometimes 
unanticipated) will reveal themselves only with 
time. W i l l herder numbers decline further as a 
result o f Chernobyl? W i l l the slaughter indu-
stry take on a new structure? M u c h further re-
search is necessary to determine to what extent 
such developments materialize, what part Cher-
nobyl has played in them, and what their conse-
quences will be. 
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